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Joint Tenancy in Colorado
By HAROLD E. POPHAM
of the Denver Bar

EDITOR'S NOTE: This, in substance, is the paper presented by Mr. Popham before
the session on Probate, Trust and Real Estate law of the Colorado Bar Association at
its convention in Colorado Springs, October 13-15, 1949.

An estate in joint tenancy is one held by two or more persons jointly
with equal rights to share in its enjoyment during their lives, and having,
as its distinguishing feature, the right of survivorship by virtue of which the
entire estate upon the death of any of the tenants goes to the survivor, and
so on to the last survivor, who take an estate of inheritance.
To constitute joint tenancy, there must be four unities: (a) unity of
interest, (b) unity of title, (c) unity of time, and (d) unity of possession. If
anyone of these elements is lacking, the estate will not be in joint tenancy.
A unity of interest requires that the shares of the joint tenants, whatever
be their number, shall be equal and that the duration of their estate shall be
the same. A joint tenancy may exist in personal property as well as real
property.'
All natural persons may be seized or possessed of an estate in joint
tenancy. Since the relationships do not rest on contract, it is clear that disability of a person is no impediment to the formation of a joint tenancy.
A natural person cannot be a joint tenant with a corporation, nor can
hold as joint tenants. A husband and wife may
two or more corporations
2
also be joint tenants.
Joint tenancies may be in fee, for lifc, for years, or in remainder. Vhen
it is desired to hold stocks and securities in joint tenancy in the names of two
or more persons, the following language should appear after their names:
"As joint tenants and not as tenants in common" or "As joint tenants with
right of survivorship and not as tenants in common,-" The same language
should be used where a joint tenancy of securities or stock is created in a will.
Mortgages
A joint tenant may mortgage his interest and his interest
upon and sold in satisfaction of debts. In Wilkins v. Young,
69, 70 (Ind.), it is said: "Any interest in real estate which
sell and convey he may also mortgage. Jones, Mortg. Sec.
'Eisenhardt v. Lowell, 105 Colo. 417, 420. 3 C.S.A. 92-17 et seq.
2 Wilken v. Young, 41 N. E. 68, 69 (Ind.).
'3 C.S.A. 92-17.

may be levied
41 N. E. 68,
a person may
136. We are
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therefore of the opinion that a joint tenant may mortgage his interest in the
joint estate in like manner as though he were a tenant in common, and to the
extent of the mortgage lien the right of the survivor will be destroyed or
suspended, and the equity of redemption, at the death of the tenant, will be
all that will fall to the surviving companion."
The question arises, does the giving of a mortgage or a deed of trust to
secure an indebtedness by one joint tenant on his interest in the property
affect a severance of the joint tenancy? It seems that in those states where a
mortgage or deed of trust operates to convey the title in a similar manner as4
a deed, such instrument terminates the joint tenancy without further action.
Mortgages and trust deeds in Colorado are liens and not conveyances
as stated in 2 C.S.A. 40-118 as follows:
"Mortgages, trust deeds or other instruments intended to secure
the payment of an obligation affecting title to or an interest in real
property, shall not be deemed a conveyance, regardless of its terms,
so as to enable the owner of the obligation secured to recover possession of real property without foreclosure and sale, but the same shall
be deemed a lien."
Tolland Company v. First State Bank, 95 Colo. 321, follows the statute
in holding that mortgages and deeds of trust are liens and not conveyances.
There is no decision in Colorado passing upon the question as to whether a
mortgage or deed of trust would terminate a joint tenancy. In view of the
fact that by statute and by decision of our Supreme Court mortgages and
deeds of trust are not classed as conveyances but as liens, it would seem that
they would not affect a severance of a joint tenancy until after foreclosure sale.
Judgment and Execution Liens
In Ziegler v. Bonnell, 126 P. (2d) 118 (Calif.), we find the rule as to
judgment liens stated on page 120 of the opinion:
"* * * When a creditor has a judgment lien against the interest
of one joint tenant he can immediately execute and sell the interest
of his judgment debtor, and thus sever the joint tenancy, or he can
keep his lien alive and wait until the joint tenancy is terminated by
the death of one of the joint tenants. If the judgment debtor survives,
the judgment lien immediately attaches to the entire property. If the
judgment debtor is the first to die, the lien is lost. If the creditor
sits back to await this contingency, as respondent did in this case, he
assumes the risk of losing his lien." 4a
In Van Antwerp v. Horan, 161 A.L.R. 1133, 61 N.E. (2d) 358 (Ill.),
it is decided that mere execution levy upon real estate on the interest of one
'Hardin

v. Wolf, 148 N. E. 868, 872 (Ill.)

903, 907 (Ill.)

and, Tindall v. Yeats, 68 N. E. 2d

,a People's Trust & Savings Bank v. Haas, 160 N. E. 81 (Ill.), and Musa v. Segelke
6' Kohlhaus Co., 111 A.L.R. 168 (Wis.), support the above rule. The latter case has an
annotation on the question.
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joint tenant which does4 not transfer possession to the sheriff does not terminate the joint tenancy. b
Partition
Partition could not be enforced under common law, but generally under
state statutes a joint tenant may enforce partition. Prior to this year, our
partition statute was 4 C.S.A., Chap. 122. Section 1 of this act provided that
"When any lands, tenements or hereditaments shall be held in joint tenancy,
tenancy in common or co-parcenary" it shall be lawful for one or more persons interested to bring an action for partition.
The whole of Chapter 122 was repealed by Chapter 193, 1949 Session
Laws, page 544. Section 1 of the latter act reads as follows: "Actions for
the division and partition of real or personal property or interest therein
may be maintained by any person having an interest in such property." Section 2 reads: "All persons having any interest, direct, beneficial, contingent,
or otherwise, in such property shall be made parties." It would seem that
this language is sufficiently broad to include joint tenants.
Bank Accounts and Wills
Joint tenancy in bank accounts may be created. 5 Section 45 of Chapter
18, 35 C.S.A. covers this question in Colorado. It provides that when a bank
deposit in any bank or trust company in this state is made in the names of
two or more persons payable to them, or to any of them, such deposit, or
any part thereof, or any interest or dividend thereon may be paid to any one
of said persons, whether the others be living or not, and such deposit shall
be deemed to be owned by said persons in joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship.
Where a devise or bequest to two or more persons by name is in such
form as to create a joint tenancy and one of them dies before the testator,
the whole interest vests in the survivors. Therefore a joint tenant cannot
devise or bequeath his interest since a will does not take effect until after the
testator's death, at which instant the claim of the surviving tenant arises and
goes into effect. 6 Creditors have no recourse against the interest of a joint
tenant who dies.
American Policy Opposed to Joint Tenancy
As a general rule under the common law in the feudal period a conveyance to two or more persons was construed as a joint tenancy, but that
rule later came into disfavor both in England and in America. The policy
of the American law is opposed to survivorship and in accordance with this
b See also Thornburg v. Wiggins, 34 N. E. 999, 1002 (Ind.), Midgley v. Walker,
60 N. W. 296, (Mich.), and annotations at 161 A.L.R. 1139.
' First National Bank of Aurora v. Mulich, 83 Colo. 518.
' 3 C.S.A. 92-18 to 23.

316

DICTA

policy legislation abrogating the common law rule and modifying or abolishing
the doctrine of survivorship has been enacted in most of the states. Such
statutes in general provide in effect that all grants and devises of land made
to two or more persons shall be construed to create estates in common and
not in joint tenancy unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy. 7 Notable
exceptions to these statutes are conveyances to trustees and executors.
Colorado Joint Tenancy Law
In 1861, the Colorado legislature enacted a statute which read as follows:
"No estate in joint tenancy, in any lands, tenements or hereditaments, shall
be held or claimed under any grant, devise or conveyance whatsoever hereafter made other than to executors and trustees, unless the premises therein
mentioned shall be thereby expressly declared to pass, not in tenancy in
common, but in joint tenancy; and every such estate, other than to executors
or trustees (unless otherwise expressly declared as aforesaid) shall be deemed
to be tenancy in common." (2 C.S.A., Chap. 40, Sec. 4.)
This statute remained unchanged until 1939, when it was amended to
clarify who might be grantors and grantees in a deed creating a joint tenancy.
The statute, as amended, reads as follows: "No estate in joint tenancy, in
any lands, tenements or hereditaments, shall be held or claimed under any
grant, devise or conveyance whatsoever hereafter made other than to executors and trustees, unless the premises therein mentioned be thereby expressly
declared to pass, not in tenancy in common, but in joint tenancy, provided,
always, that such expressed declaration as aforesaid shall be deemed effective
to create an estate in joint tenancy whether in a grant, devise or conveyance
hereafter made from one person to others, or from one person to himself and
another or others, or from tenants in common to themselves or to themselves
and another or others, or from joint tenants to themselves and another or
others. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to exempt any transfer from
the operation of chapter 85 of the 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated or
chapter 75A of the supplement thereto." (1939 Session Laws, Ch. 40, p. 285.)
Must Exact Statutory Language Be Used?
The question naturally arises whether or not an instrument intended to
create a joint tenancy must contain the exact language contained in this
statute, namely: "Not in tenancy in common, but in joint tenancy." Title
examiners frequently are faced with deeds that apparently attempt to create
a joint tenancy, but do not use the exact language of the statute, and they
are compelled to make a decision as to whether the instrument is sufficient
for joint tenancy purposes. I have come to the conclusion that it is not neces,
sary to use the exact statutory language in order to create an estate in joint
tenancy if it appears from the instrument that it was the intent of the grantor
to create such an estate. 8
Estate of Kwatkowski, 94 Colo. 222, 224.
C. J. p. 901, 905.
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In Sturkis v. Sturkis, 146 N. E. 530 (Ill.) one Carl Edward Wagoner
and Catharina Wagoner, his wife, conveyed to Rudolph Perlick and Henrietta Perlick, his wife, "as joint tenants and not as tenants in common"
certain real estate in Chicago. The granting and habendum clauses in the
deed did not contain the language above quoted but referred to second parties, their heirs and assigns. The conveyance was by warranty deed. It was
claimed by appellants that the deed conveyed the premises to the grantees
as tenants in common and not in joint tenancy while the appellees claimed
that the deed created a joint tenancy in the grantees. It was held by the
Supreme Court that.the deed conveyed an estate in joint tenancy.
While the statute involved in this case is not set forth in the opinion,
it was as follows: "No estate in joint tenancy, in any lands, tenements or
hereditaments, shall be held or claimed under any grant, devise or conveyance whatsoever, heretofore or hereafter made, other than to executors and
trustees, unless the premises therein mentioned shall expressly be thereby declared to pass, not in tenancy in common but in joint tenancy; and every
such estate, other than to executors or trustees (unless otherwise expressly
declared as aforesaid) shall be deemed to be in tenancy in common." This
is almost the exact language of our statute. 9
Superfluous Language in Joint Tenancy Deeds
The ordinary form of joint tenancy deed, which seems to be in common
use in Colorado, adds language that is not contained in the statute. The
conveyance in the granting clause generally runs to parties of the second part
not in tenancy in ccmmon but in joint tenancy "the survivor of them, their
assigns and the heirs and assigns of such survivor forever." The habendum
clause is to said parties of the second part, "the survivor of them, their assigns
and the heirs and assigns of such survivor forever." The survivorship language
does not appear in our statute. The case of Jones v. Snyder, 188 N. W. 505,
(Mich.) held that in a deed to four grantees "as joint tenants, and to their
heirs and assigns, and to the survivors or survivor of them, and to the heirs
and assigns of the survivors or survivor of them" created a joint tenancy for
life Inthe grantees with a contingent remainder in fee simple to the survivor
rather than creating a fee title in the joint tenants. Under such a situation
none of the joint tenants would be able to break the joint tenancy by conveyance of their interest.
This case was criticized in Greiger v. Pye, 297 N. W. 173, 175 (Minn.),
where it was said that such holding does not seem in accord with the decisions in other jurisdictions, as would be shown by an examination of the
annotations in 129 A.L.R. 813, et seq.
9

See also Coudert v. Earl, 18 A. 220 (N.J.); Murray v. Kator, 190 N. W. 667
(Mich.); and Taylor v. Lowencamp, 145 A. 329 (N.J.).
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Estate in Entirety Distinguished
It is well at this point to distinguish between an estate in joint tenancy
and one in entirety. In Sanderson.v. Everson, 141 N. W. 1025 (Nebr.), an
estate by the entirety is defined as follows: "* * * The rule of entireties does
not depend upon and is not created by contract. It is a fiction of the common
law, having its origin in the feudal system, that where land was conveyed to
the husband and wife jointly the title by entireties was created in them by
act of law, and neither could dispose of the property without the consent of
the other; each owned the entire title."
Estates in entirety do not exist in Colorado. In Wyman v. Johnston, 62
Colo. 461, it was held that our statute, 4 C.S.A. 108-1, concerning married
women's property, is in conflict with the common law relating to estates by
entireties and that the statute has abolished such an estate in Colorado.
Severance and Termination
The courts are virtually unanimous in agreeing that a joint tenant may,
at his pleasure, dispose of his share and that such conveyance will result in a
severance or termination of the joint tenancy.0'
Occasionally a title examiner is called upon to pass on a deed from a
joint tenant which conveys a specified undivided interest; for instance, an
undivided one-half interest, and the question arises, Is such a description
sufficient?
Patton on Titles, Section 146, Note 638, page 79, 1946 Cumulative
Pocket Part, states that the courts "are practically unanimous that a conveyance by a joint tenant which would be effective if he had held the interest in
severalty will be effective to break the joint tenancy and to give to the grantee
a fractional interest in proportion to the number of owners who held as joint
tenants." He refers to Section 249, page 794 of the original text where it is
said: "But he can convey a fractional undivided interest in the premises
proportionate to the number of the joint tenants." In the cases cited in the
text, I have been unable to find one where the conveyance was of a specified
undivided interest, such as a one-half interest. In Wilkin v. Young, 41 N. E.
68 (Ind.), it is.said: "It is settled in law that a joint tenant may alienate or
convey to a stranger his part or interest in the realty, and thereby defeat the
right of the survivor. * * * In the ancient language of the law, joint tenants
were said to hold per my et per tout, or, in plain words, 'by the moiety or
half and by all'; the'true interpretation of this phrase being that these tenants
were seized of the entire realty for the purpose of tenure and survivorship,
while for the purpose of immediate alienation each had only a particular part
or interest. * * *"
If one of two joint tenants conveys his interest to a third person, in
general language and not by describing it as a specified undivided interest,
" 14 Am. Jur., Co-Tenancy, p. 79.
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the grantee becomes the owner of an undivided one-half interest and a tenant in common with the other joint tenant. It would, therefore seem that a
deed of an undivided one-half interest should be sufficient. I have found the
following cases that support this theory:
1. Kozacik v. Kozacik, 26 So. 2d 659 (Fla., 1946), holding that a
"Written contract by which joint tenant agreed to sell his undivided onehalf interest in realty to son, though not executed in presence of two subscribing witnesses as required by statute for conveyance of realty, was sufficient to terminate joint tenancy and destroy cotenant's right of survivorship."
2. In re Cotter's Will, 287 N.Y.S. 670. In this case one joint tenant
deeded to his associate joint tenant "all my undivided one-half right, title and
interest in and to" the premises. It was held that this created a severance of
the joint tenancy by the conveyance of an entire interest."
Tc

Problems of Pcrrmnount Importance

In considering the question of placing property in joint tenancy, the
taxing laws should always be borne in mind, viz.: Federal gift, estate and
income taxes, and the Colorado gift, inheritance and income taxes. As to
Federal gift taxes, each donor has a $30,000.00 exemption which may be used
in whatever manner he sees fit.1 2 If the gift in any one year does not exceed
$3,000.00, no return is required. 13 If over $3,000.00, the donor must file a
return and the donee must file an information return. On gifts made since
April 2, 1948, to a spouse, a marital deduction is allowed to equal one-half
of the value of the joint tenancy interest transferred to the spouse.' 4
For example, where H purchases house with own funds for $20,000.00
and has title conveyed to H and W as joint tenants, H must file gift tax
return and W must file donee's information return. Computation of tax
(assuming no prior taxable gifts at any time):
Value of gift to W (V of purchase price) ..........................
$10,000.00
Less: marital deduction (V of gift) ------------------------------5,000.00

$ 5,000.00
Less: $3,000.00 annual exclusion ......................................
3,000.00

N et gift tax .....................................................
$ 2,000.00
A portion of H's $30,000.00 specific exemption may then be applied to cancel the $2,000.00 so no tax would be due.
The Colorado law allows a specific gift exemption of $20,000.00 on
gifts to a spouse, child or lineal descendent of donor born in lawful wedlock.
11See, also, Green v. Skinner, 197 P. 60 (Calif.), and In re Weissbach's Estate,

183, N.Y.S. 771, 774.
"I.R.C., Sec. 1004 (a) (1).
18 I.R.C.. Sec. 1006 (a)-Reg. 108, Sec. 86.23.
4
' .R.C., Sec. 1004 (a) (3).
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If gifts in any one year do not exceed $2500.00, no return need be made.
If over $2500.00, donor must file return and donee an information return.
Colorado has no marital deduction as the Federal statute has. 15
Under the Federal estate tax law, the entire value of the property owned
jointly is included in the estate of the joint tenant dying first, except such
part thereof as originally belonged to the survivor or was never received from
16
deceased for less than an adequate consideration in money or money's worth.
If more than one contributed to the purchase, records should be kept to show
the contributions of each.
The Colorado inheritance tax law provides that on the death of a joint
tenant only one-half of the value at date of death is included in his estate
for inheritance tax purposes, regardless of who contributed to the purchase
price.' 7 A gratuitous transfer from a person to himself and another in joint
tenancy within two years prior to donor's death is presumed to have been
made in contemplation of death, to the extent of the full value of the property passing to the survivor.
If one takes property by will or inheritance, the basis for figuring Federal
income taxes is the fair market value at time of death.' 8 Thus, if one takes
as a surviving joint tenant, the basis for computing gain or loss on a subsequent
sale by the survivor is the adjusted cost of the property (which takes into
consideration20 depreciation, capital additions, etc.) 19 The same rules apply
in Colorado.
Conclusions As To Tax Problems
1. If property is purchased in joint tenancy when prices are low and
they rise, there may be an income disadvantage, and the saving by avoiding
costs of administration of an estate may be more than offset by increased
income taxes. If purchased on a high market and values go down, there may
be a capital loss, if other than residence property.
2. In the ordinary small estates where Federal estate taxes are not involved and the purchase is made on a high market, joint tenancy is best. In
all other cases, all facts should be carefully considered before a decision is made.
3. In some instances where joint tenancy exists, it may be desirable to
separate the interests and dissolve the joint tenancy in order to create a more
advantageous income tax position or to escape the entire property being taxed
upon the death of the survivor.
Buy Christmas Seals
C.S.A., Chap. 75A.
"I.R.C., Sec. 811 (e).
C.S.A., Ch. 85-8.
"I.R.C., Sec. 113(a) (5).
Levy v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 109.
:C.S.A., Sec. 84A-18 (5).
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Curative Statutes of Colorado Respecting
Titles to Real Estate
By PERCY S. MORRIS,
of the Denver Bar
EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the concluding portion of Mr. Morris' classic, the first half
of which appeared in the November DICTA. The whole article is a revision of the one
originally published on this subject by Mr. Morris in the February and March 1939
DICTA. An alphabetical index to all subject heading in both installments appears at
the conclusion on pages 339 and 340.
LIMITATIONS-MAY BE ASSERTED AFFIRMATIVELY.

At common

law

a

statute of limitations is a shield and not a sword; it can at common law be
asserted only by way of defense against an action brought by another and
not affirmatively as basis for an action. However, 1927 S. L. 604, Sec. 41,
1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 148, provides that the limitations "herein provided
for" (evidently meaning the limitations provided in the entire Chapter 150
of the 1927 Session Laws) may be asserted either affirmatively or by way of
defense and may be used in any action as a source of, or as a means to, establish title or the right of possession or as an aid or explanation of title and
that actions may be maintained affirmatively to establish the limitations provided in said Chapter 150 of the 1927 Session Laws. In Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation v. Schmidt, 109 Colo. 467, 473, 126 Pac. (2d) 1036, our
Supreme Court said that it is true that, as a general rule of law, statutes of
limitation are held to be available only as a matter of defense or bar to the
bringing of an action, but that, because of the provisions of this section, the
general rule had no application. It held the. General Assembly had the
power to pass such legislation and that, having in mind the intent and purpose of the entire 1927 Act, permission to assert affirmatively the limitations
contained therein included such as are found in the sections discussed herein
under the heading Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds.
LIMITATIONS-PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY. Many of the curative statutes herein discussed are statutes of limitation which make no exception in
the 6ase of minors, mental incompetents or others under legal disability.
That these statutes operate to bar the rights of all persons, whether under
legal disability or not, seems clear from the decision of our Supreme Court
in a case involving a limitation contained in the Workmen's Compensation
Act, in which the Court held that, unless specific exception is made in the
statute of limitations in favor of those under disability, courts are without
power to add such exception. Miller v. Industrial Commission, 106 Colo.
364, 367, 105 Pac. (2d) 404. A fortiori, a statute such as 1935 C.S.A.
Ch. 40, Sec. 147, mentioned under the heading Decrees, Judgments and
Official Deeds, which imposes upon persons under legal disability a limitation
period which is two years longer than the one imposed upon persons not
under legal disability, is unquestionably valid.
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MECHANIC'S LIENS. One of the most perplexing problems of attorneys
ekamining titles has been the situation where a mechanic's lien claim was
filed of record a long time before the examination and the abstract shows no
release of the lien claim and nothing indicating any suit brought to foreclose it. The statutes have always imposed a limitation of six months after
the completion of the entire work within which to bring the suit to foreclose
a mechanic's lien, and under the decisions, if the suit was not brought within
that period, the lien was lost. However, if the suit had been brought within
that period, then the lien was preserved until the determination of such suit
and, if such determination was one which sustained the lien, then such lien
continued thereafter indefinitely. An attorney might check the records in
the offices of the Clerk of the County Court and the Clerk of the District
Court of the county wherein the real estate was situated and might ascertain
from same that no suit to foreclose the lien had been brought in either of
said courts. Nevertheless the Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Stowell, 17
Colo. 94, 28 Pac. 326 and Burton v. Graham, 36 Colo. 199, 84 Pac. 978 held
that a suit respecting real estate may be brought in any county in the state
subject only to the right of a defendant to move for a change of venue and,
if no such motion is made, the court has full jurisdiction. Therefore, so far
as the examining attorney could know, a suit might have been brought in any
one of the sixty-three counties in the state to foreclose the lien and such suit
might still be pending, or a judgment sustaining the lien may have been
entered although not followed by any recording of a certified copy of the
judgment or a Sheriff's Certificate of Purchase or a Sheriff's Deed. To remedy
this situation a statute was passed in 1915 (1915 S. L. 333; 1921 Comp.
Laws, Sec. 6451; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 101, Sec. 24) which provided that, in
order to hold the lien, the suit must not only be commenced within said
period of six months but a notice of lispendens must be filed within that
period in the office of the Recorder of the county wherein the land involved
is situated. However, in the case of Laverents v. Craig, 74 Colo. 297, 225
Pac. 250, the Supreme Court in effect nullified this provision, holding, because of certain phraseology in the statute and because of the general nature
of lispendens, that the filing of the lispendens was required by the statute
only for the "protection of third parties who might deal with the property
in ignorance of the contractor's claim" and that the lispendens is "not a necessary prerequisite of a suit where the action is against the owner of the
property, or one primarily liable for the debt". This left for the title attorney the problem as to how his client could "deal with the property in ignorance of the contractor's claim" when the abstract showed a notice of the lien
of the contractor. In order to remedy this situation a statute was passed by
the 1937 Session of the Legislature (1937 S. L. 481, Sec. 4; 1935 C.S.A.
Suppl. Ch. 101, Sec. 24) changing in various respects the phraseology of
the previous statute so as to make it more clear and explicit and adding the
words "as against the owner of the property or as against one primarily liable
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for the debt upon which the lien is based or as against anyone who is neither
the owner of the property nor one primarily liable for such debt." To extend these provisions to lien claims filed before the passage of the statute,
there was at the same time adopted a new section (1937 S. L. 482, Sec. 5; 1935
C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 101, Sec. 24 (1)). This provides that no lien statement filed
for record prior to the date when such section took effect shall "as against
the owner of the property or as against one primarily liable for the debt
upon which the lien is based or as against anyone who is neither the owner
of the property nor one primarily liable for such debt," hold the property
longer than one year after the date when such section took effect, unless
an action shall have been commenced prior to the expiration of said one
year to enforce the same and unless also, prior to the expiration of said one
year, there shall have been filed for record with the Recorder of the county in
which the property is situated either a notice stating that such action has been
commenced, or a certified copy of a decree or judgment enforcing such lien
rendered in such action, or a certificate of purchase evidencing the purchase of
the property at a sale thereof made pursuant to the provisions of a decree or
judgment rendered in such action, or a deed conveying the property under such
a sale.
MORTGAGES. See Liens-Extinguishment of; and Limitations-Lien Barred
when Indebtedness is Barred.
NAMES, VARIANCES IN. When a man or a woman executes a conveyance
of or an encumbrance upon real estate, he or she is often not particular as
to whether his or her name, as it appears in the paper he or she signs, is
identical with his or her name as it appeared in the instrument by which
the title was acquired. As the result, attorneys have been plagued with
questions such as: Is the title acquired by a deed to John T. Jones conveyed
by a deed naming him as J. T. Jones, or vice versa? Is the title acquired by a
deed to J. T. Jones conveyed by a deed naming him as J. Thomas Jones, or
vice versa? The decisions, either of the Colorado courts or of the courts
outside Colorado, did not settle these questions. So in 1941, there was
enacted a statute (1941 S. L. 607-608; 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 40, Sec. 117
(4)) which provided that variances between any two instruments affecting
the title to the same real property, both of which shall have been of record
for more than three years in the office of the Recorder of the county in which
such real estate is situate, with respect to the names of persons named- in the
respective instruments or acknowledgments thereto or in the signatures thereto
in the particulars hereinafter mentioned, irrespective of which one of the
two instruments was prior in point of time to the other and irrespective of
whether the instruments were executed or originated before or after the time
when the statute took effect, shall not destroy or impair the presumption that
the person so named in one of said instruments was the same person as the
one so named in the other which would exist if the names in the two instruments were identical. Such statute further provided that, in spite of any
such variance, the person so named in one of said two instruments shall be
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presumed to be the same person as the one so named in the other until such
time as the contrary appears and, until such time, either or both of such instruments or the record thereof or certified copy or copies of the record
thereof shall be admissible in evidence in the same manner as though the
names in the two instruments were identical. The variances which are
mentioned in the statute as not impairing the presumption that would exist
had the names been identical are the following: (1) The full Christian name
appearing in one instrument and only the initial letter of that Christian name
appearing in the other; (2) the full middle name appearing in one instrument and only the initial letter of that middle name appearing in the other;
and (3) the initial letter of a middle name appearing in one and not in the
other. The statute further stated that the word "instruments" as used therein
means not only instruments voluntarily executed but also papers filed or issued
in or in connection with actions and other proceedings in court and orders,
judgments and decrees entered therein and transcripts of uch judgments and
proceedings in foreclosure pursuant to powers of sale. In Title Standard No.
18 it was stated that names in birth certificates, death certificates and mar,
riage certificates are within the -effect of this statute. It is to be noted that
the curative effect of this statute is limited to the three respective situations
above listed and that the statute does not operate to remedy defects existing
from other variances in names or from the combination in the same name of
two of the variances mentioned in the statute. For example, after both instruments have been of record for more than three years, the name J. T.
Jones appearing in one of them could, under this statute, be presumed to
designate the person named in the other instrument as John T. Jones or as
J. Thomas Jones or as J. Jones, but could not, under such statute, be presumed to designate the person named in the other instrument as John Thomas
Jones. However, where both instruments have been of record for more than
twenty years, many defects caused by variances in names which are not corrected by the operation of this 1941 statute may be remedied by the operation of the 1927 statute discussed under the heading "Recitals Prima Facie
Evidence," especially where the later of the two instruments is a warranty
deed containing the customary recitals that the grantor is the owner of the
property and has good right, full power and lawful authority to convey the
property. And, although it does not belong in an article on curative statutes,
the writer cannot resist the urge to make the statement at this point that
many variances in names which are not covered by the two statutes that
have been mentioned may be disregarded if the instrument executed by the
person in question contains an acknowledgment in proper form naming him
by the proper name. See Patton on Titles, page 213, Section 53 and
Chivington v. Colorado Springs Co., 9 Colo. 597, 604, 14 Pac. 212.
OFFICIAL DEEDS. See Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds; and Official Sales.
OFFICIAL SALES. It sometimes is found that a Sheriff's Certificate of
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Purchase or a Public Trustee's Certificate of Purchase was recorded and no
Sheriff's Deed or Public Trustee's Deed was ever executed and recorded based
upon such sale. Because of this there were passed in 1937 two sections
(1937 S. L. 472-473, Secs. 1 and 2; 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 40, Secs. 164
and 164 (1)). Said Section 164 included a new provision that the deed shall
be issued by the Trustee, Sheriff or other official within nine months from
the expiration of the last period of redemption and not thereafter. Said Sec.
164 (1) provides that, if the person entitled to the deed shall not apply for
the deed within such nine months or if no such deed be issued to him within
such period, all rights under the Certificate of Purchase, including any rights
of any lienor who has redeemed therefrom, shall terminate, and no person
shall be entitled to receive such deed, and the ofcial who made the sale shall
not have the power to execute such deed. Such section then provides: that
after such nine months the holder of the Certificate of Purchase, if no redemption has been made, or the lienor last redeeming shall have a lien on
the property sold superior and prior to all liens and encumbrances recorded
subsequent to the recording of the lien on which the sale was based, for the
amount which would have been necessary to redeem the property on the
last day of the last period of redemption, plus interest thereon and all taxes,
insurance premiums and other lawful and proper charges advanced or paid
by such person; that such lien may be enforced only by an action commenced in the proper court to foreclose the same in the manner and method
provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages; that such lien shall
continue in effect only for fifteen months from the date when such person
became entitled to a deed; and that after the expiration of such fifteen months,
if no action to foreclose such lien has been commenced and no lis pendens of
such action has been filed as provided by law, then it shall conclusively be
presumed that such lien has been paid and discharged and no release or other
acquittance shall be necessary or required to discharge such lien. Such section further provides: that in cases where the property had been sold before
the section took effect, and the party entitled to a deed had not received it,
he may apply for such deed and receive it within nine months from the
date that said section became effective; that, if he fails to do so, then he
may commence an action within fifteen months from the c1hte when the
section became effective to foreclosure such lien and not thereafter; and that,
if no action to foreclose such lien has been commenced and no lis pendens
of such action has been filed as provided by law within such fifteen months,
then it shall be conclusively presumed that such lien had been paid and discharged and no release or other acquittance shall be necessary or required to
discharge such lien. In Green v. Hoefler, 115 Colo. 287, 290-291, 173 Pac.
(2d) 208, our Supreme Court held that, the holder of the Certificate of
Purchase having made no demand for a deed, and having brought no action
to foreclose, and having filed no lis pendens, within fifteen months after the
first date when she became entitled to a deed, it must, under the mandate
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of this statute, conclusively be presumed that the lien evidenced by the
Certificate of Purchase had been paid and discharged and that her action
thereafter was barred by the limitation of this statute.
OPTIONS TO PURCHASE. Previous to 1927 considerable difficulty was
encountered through the owner of property having given an option to purchase the property, which option was recorded but no sale and conveyance
thereunder was ever consummated. Such options constituted clouds upon the
title because the fact that they were of record gave notice of possible rights
of the optionee. Anyone dealing with the property was put upon the
duty of inquiring as to whether the optionee had, in accordance with its terms,
tendered performance and payment. Therefore in each such case it was
necessary to secure a quit claim deed from the optionee or to quiet title.
To remedy these situations there was in 1927 enacted a section (1927 S. L.
591, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 116) which provided that recorded instruments of the nature of an option to purchase, affecting title to real property,
under the terms of which possession is "not delivered to the purchaser, *shall
not constitute notice to any person for a period of more than one year after
the time specified .therein for the conveyance of the property and that after
the expiration of such period such instrument shall cease to be notice to any
person for any purpose. Such section further provided that all such instruments which shall have been recorded prior to the time the section took
effect shall constitute notice only for one year from the time the section goes
into effect or for one year from the time in said instruments specified for
performance, whichever of the two times shall be the later, and thereafter
the same shall cease to be notice to any person for any purpose. Such section contained the proviso that if, prior to the expiration of said beriod,
legal notice of the pendency of an action be filed for record, then such instrument and lis pendens shall continue to be notice until three months after
the final termination or disposition of the suit. It is to be noted that the
provisions of this section relate only to instruments "of the nature of an
option to purchase * * * under the terms of which instruments possession
is not delivered to the purchaser." Therefore, the provisions of this section
do not apply to the customary form of a contract of sale under the terms
of which the purchaser makes a down payment and thereafter makes periodical payments and during the period of the making of such payments he is
entitled to possession of the property. Particular attention should be given
to whether the instrument in question is of the nature of an option to purchase, or is of the nature of a binding contract for the sale and purchase, and
to whether, by the terms of the instrument, possession of the property is
delivered to the purchaser.
PUBLIC TRUSTEES. See also: Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds;
Estates-Foreclosure of Deeds of Trust against; Liens-Extinguishment of;
Public Trustee's Sales--Place of Sale; Releases before Maturity; Releases of
Trust Deeds-to Whom Made; Successors in Trust; and Trust Deeds Merely
Liens.
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PUBLIC TRUSTEE'S SALES-PLACE OF SALE. When the present Denver
City and County Building was built and occupied and the old Court House
was vacated and shortly thereafter torn down, the situation arose of most
deeds of trust, which had been previously executed, having prescribed that
the place of sale thereunder should be either the encumbered premises or the
Tremont Street front door of the Court House. Since there was no longer any
Tremont Street front door of a Court House in Denver, this situation was
the subject of some discussion among the attorneys. Accordingly, there were
passed in 1933 four sections (1933 S. L. 793-794, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs.
58-61) which made valid sales by Public Trustees, both those previously made
and those made in the future, where they were or are made at the Bannock
Street main entrance to the new City and County Building in Denver or at
the door, side or entrance of the Court House which shall have been destroyed or removed or the site thereof otherwise changed or at the door,
side or entrance of any new Court House or any building or place temporarily serving as a Court House or at the place specified in the trust deed, even
though the Court House was not there maintained at the time of the sale or
at any door, side or entrance of the new City and County Building in Denver
or at any door, side or entrance of a new Court House or building or place
temporarily used for a Court House. They provided a limitation of ninety
days after the sections took effect for the bringing of a suit or proceeding
based upon a claim that the sale was held at the place designated in the
trust deed which was no longer at the time of the sale a Court House, or
upon the ground that such sale was held at a place not designated in the
trust deed but which was then actually a Court House.
RECITALS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE. Occasionally in examining a title it
is found that-there is a defect in the title which requires, in order to correct it,
the perpetuation of testimony or a declaratory judgment to establish certain
facts or a suit to quiet title and it is found that certain recitals in instruments
of record set out the required facts. In the absence of a statute, these recitals
would not constitute any evidence but would be self-serving declarations or
hearsay. Believing that, where an instrument in the chain of title to a piece
of real estate contains a recital of certain facts and such instrument has been
of record a long time without anyone bringing any legal proceeding to
challenge the truth of such facts, such recitals should be admissible in evidence

as prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts set forth therein, a statute
was passed in 1927 (1927 S. L. 589; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 112). It provided that all recitals contained in instruments affecting title to real estate,
which have remained or shall have remained of record in the office of the
Recorder of the county where the real property affected is situated for a
period of twenty years, shall be accepted and received as prima facie evidence
of the facts recited therein, except as to recitals which are mentioned herein
under the heading Reference to another Instrument. This statute is the
basis for Title Standards Nos. 19, 51 and 59.
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RECORDING A LONG TIME AFTER EXECUTION OF INSTRUMENT. Very
often in examining a title an attorney finds that a deed was not recorded
until a long time after its execution. In 1928 our Supreme Court in its
decision in Larison v. Taylor, 83 Colo. 430, 442, 266 Pac. 217, said: "There
is no presumption of the delivery of a deed where it is not recorded until
long after its date." This immediately placed a serious question upon the
validity of any deed which had not been recorded until long after its date.
It also, in connection therewith, imposed upon examining attorneys the responsibility of passing upon the question of what period would constitute
"long after its date," which to the writer is very much like the question
"How long is a piece of string?"It also raised the question of whether, assuming
that the deed had not been recorded until long after its date, the defect
occasioned thereby would be corrected by any lapse of time after it was
recorded and, if so, how long a lapse of time is required. This decision was
probably the cause of attorneys receiving more money in fees for bringing
suits to quiet title than any other event in the history of the Colorado bar.
To remedy this situation there was passed by the 1937 Session of the Legislature (1937 S.L. 477) an amendment of 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 107,
the section prescribing the form of acknowledgment and the effect thereof.
This amendment, as corrected by an amendment passed by the 1939 Session (1939 S. L. 289-290; 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch.. 40, Sec. 107), reenacted the previous statute except that at the end of the last paragraph
of the section it added the following language: "irrespective of the length
of time that may have elapsed between the date of such instrument and the
date when such instrument was so recorded. The provisions hereof shall
relate and apply to all instruments which shall have been executed prior to
the time when this section takes effect, as well as to all instruments which
are executed after the time when this section takes effect, irrespective of
whether such instruments shall have been acknowledged before or after the
time when this section takes effect and irrespective of whether such instruments are recorded before or after the- time when this section takes effect."
REFERENCE TO ANOTHER INSTRUMENT.

Previous to 1927 attorneys had

a great deal of trouble through recorded instruments in the chain of title
containing a reference to some other instrument which either was not of
record or, if of record, was not correctly described in the reference. This
trouble arose most frequently through incorrect description of an encumbrance of record; for example, a deed of record might contain a provision
that it was "subject to a mortgage of $2,000.00." In such case there might
be of record no mortgage securing $2,000.00 [but there might be of record
a deed of trust securing $2,000.00or an encumbrance, either trust deed or
mortgage, which originally secured $2,500.00 which amount had at the time
the deed was executed been reduced to $2,000.00. The attorneys felt that
there was serious danger of it being held that a deed of trust was not a
"mortgage" or that, in view of the difference in the amount of the encum-
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brance mentioned in the deed and the amount of the encumbrance of record,
it might be claimed that the one did not refer to the other, with the result
that the recital in the deed might be taken to refer to an instrument which
had not been recorded and put everyone dealing with the property on notice
that there was an unrecorded "mortgage of $2,000.00." And it was felt that
in other cases the reference in an instrument to some other instrument, where
the latter was not of record, would put each person dealing with the property upon notice of the existence of such unrecorded instrument, with the
duty of pursuing an investigation to ascertain the terms of such unrecorded
instrument, with the consequent clouding of the title. To remedy this situation there was passed in 1927 a section (1927 S. L. 589; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40,
Sec. 113) providing that, when an instrument affecting title to real estate
shall have been recorded and contains a recitation of or reference to some other
instrument purporting to affect title to said property, such recitation or reference shall bind only the parties to the instrument and shall not be notice to
any other person whatsoever, unless the instrument mentioned or referred
to in the recital be of record in the county where the property is situated and,
unless it is so recorded, no one other than the parties to the instrument shall
be required to make any inquiry or investigation concerning such recitation or
reference and that, as to recitations or references contained in instruments
recorded prior to the time when the statute took effect, the same shall, after
the expiration of one year from the date when the statute took effect, cease
to be notice unless the instrument referred to in the reservation, exception or
reference be actually recorded within said one-year period. In Rocky Mountain Fuel Company v. Clayton Coal Company, 110 Colo. 334, 340, 134 Pac.
(2d) 1062, our Supreme Court held that this section was conclusive on the
point that a reference in a recorded lease to an unrecorded contract of sale
bound only the parties to the lease and was not notice to any other person
whomsoever.
RELEASES BEFORE MATURITY. In the old days many attorneys questioned
whether the fact that a release was executed before the maturity of the indebtedness secured by a trust deed did not put any subsequent purchaser or
encumbrancer upon inquiry as to whether the note secured by the trust deed
was owned by the original payee at the time of the release or, if it had been
transferred to someone else before maturity, as to whether the then owner
of the note had requested the execution of the release. Accordingly, in 1893
there was passed a section (1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 83) providing that
the recital in any release or partial release of a deed of trust of the payment
or partial payment of the indebtedness secured by such triust deed shall, as
to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of the property mentioned in the
release, be evidence of such payment so as to give full effect to such release
when such release was executed before maturity of said indebtedness, if the
release was duly and legally executed by the proper trustee according to the
purport thereof, to the same extent and with the same force as the release of
any trust deed when executed after the maturity of the indebtedness.
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RELEASES OF TRUST DEEDS-To WHOM MADE. Until comparatively recent years it had been uniformly held by the Supreme Court that, although
a mortgage constituted only a lien, a deed of trust with power of sale conveyed to the trustee the legal title to the property. See decisions cited under
the heading Trust Deeds Merely Liens herein. Therefore, in a case where
the maker of the deed of trust afterwards conveyed the property by quit
claim deed and the subsequent release with its usual words of conveyance of
title, as well as of release, was made to the person who had executed the
deed of trust instead of to the then owner, such release conveyed to the
original owner the naked legal title to the property, leaving his grantee owning only an equitable title. Becanse of this, very often in cases of this kind
examining attorneys required quit claim deeds from the original owners.
Because of this situation, in 1893 a section was adopted (1935 C.S.A. Ch.
40, Sec. 84), providing that all releases of deeds of trust theretofore or
thereafter made shall be good and valid as to the recitals therein, whether
made to the original maker of said deed or to a subsequent purchaser of the
premises in such release described, and there was adopted in 1927 a section
(1927 S. L. 593; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 120) providing that all instruments executed for the purpose of releasing any lien or encumbrance against
real property shall be considered only as discharging and cancelling such lien
or encumbrance and that no such release shall convey to any person except
the record owner of the property any right, title or interest in the property
and that words of conveyance used in any such release shall be construed
only as in such section provided.
REPRESENTATIVES. See Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds; Estates-

Commenced in Wrong County; Estates-Sales in, not to be Invalidated;
Signatures of Those Acting in Representative Capacity; Successors in Trust;
Trustees; and Wills-Powers of Sale under.
SEALS. Under the common law a seal was required on every instrument
conveying or encumbering real estate. No practical purpose is under presentday practice served by the requirement that a seal be so affixed and it very
often is found that an instrument affecting the title to real estate was executed
and recorded which did not contain near the signature the word "Seal" or
any other form of seal and it was quite uncomfortable to an examining attorney to have to turn down the title because of the omission of this formality.
Accordingly, in 1917 there was adopted a statute (1917 S. L. 161, Sec. 5;
1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 15) providing that it shall not be necessary to the
proper execution of any conveyance affecting real property that the same
shall be executed under the seal of the grantor nor that any seal or scroll or
other mark be set opposite the name of the grantor. This statute, however,
does not do away with the necessity of the corporate seal being affixed to a
conveyance or encumbrance executed by a corporation. See 1935 C.S.A. Ch.
40, Sec. 39 and Ch. 41, Sec. 20.
SHERIFFS' DEEDS. See Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds; and
Official Sales.
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SIGNATURES OF THOSE ACTING IN REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY. It often
happens that a person holding an interest in or lien on real estate in an
official or representative capacity omits to place following or below his signature to the instrument his official or representative designation, such as
"President," "T rustee," etc. Formerly this happened frequently in the execution by a private trustee of a release of a deed of trust through his omitting
to place the word "Trustee" after his signature. To correct this, 1927 S. L.
605, Sec. 45; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 152, provides that, where from the
body of an instrument it is apparent that a person is conveying or is acting
in some official or representative capacity and the signature to the instrument
omits the statement of the official or representative capacity, it shall be presumed that the official or representative capacity is a part of the signature.
SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT. The Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended, definitely is not a curative statute. In
fact, it has been the cause of much perplexity and doubt on the part of title
examiners. A reference to it in this article on curative statutes is necessary
because of its effect upon certain of the curative statutes herein discussed.
For discussions of its provisions with respect to real estate titles, reference
is made to the following articles which have appeared in DICTA: by L. A.
Hellerstein in the October and November 1940 issues; by the writer of this
article in the December 1940 issue; by Wim. Hedges Robinson, Jr. in the
November 1942 issue; and by Royal C. Rubright in the January 1944 issue.
Section 205 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended
in 1942, provides that the period of military service shall not be included
in computing any period then or thereafter to be limited by any law, regulation or order for the bringing of any action or proceeding by or against any
person in military service or by or against his heirs, executors, administrators
or assigns and that no part of the period of military service which occurs
after the date of the enactment of the amendments of 1942 shall be included
in computing any period then or thereafter provided by any law for the redemption of real property sold or forfeited to enforce any obligation, tax or
assessment. Many of the curative statutes discussed in this article are in the
form of statutes of limitation upon the bringing of an action and therefore
they came within the provisions above mentioned of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act. The position taken by the Title Standards Committee of
the Denver Bar Association and approved by the Colorado Bar Association
at its annual convention on this point is stated in the following language
of the note to Title Standard No. 49, which was promulgated November 8,
1946 and relates to the sections discussed herein under the heading LiensExtinguishment of: "When Standard No. 24" (which was promulgated in
1942 and in which it was stated that, because of said provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, an attorney should not, in reliance on
said sections, render an opinion showing title free and clear of an unreleased
encumbrance falling within such sections) "was first adopted we were actively

332

DICTA

engaged in war, with millions in the service; however, more than a year has
passed since V-J Day, and under present conditions the Standard should be
amended and the Statute given full force and effect notwithstanding the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act". The policy expressed in the above
quotation has been followed by the Colorado attorneys generally by their
giving effect, in determining the merchantability of titles, to the various
curative statutes, even though they are in the form of statutes of limitation.
The customary practice of the attorneys generally of the community is a very
important factor in determining whether a title is merchantable. The circumstance that there is a possibility that the title may be held by a court to
be invalid because of a fact that does not appear on the face of the records
and is not known to exist does not necessarily mean that the title is unmerchantable; for example, a title may be perfect on the face of the records and
yet be bad as a matter of fact, because the signature to a deed was forged
or, even if it were the genuine signature of a person bearing that name, nevertheless that person was not the person of the same name to whom the property had been conveyed, or the person who executed the deed was a minor
or a mental incompetent, or a deed which is on record had never been delivered; and yet, attorneys uniformly pass titles as merchantable in spite of
such possibilities. And, for the same reasons, with the fighting war over
more than four years ago and the personnel of the armed forces long since
reduced to a peace-time basis and the number of men and women in
military service reduced to an exceedingly small fraction of their number during the fighting war, the infinitesimal chance that someone claiming an interest in the property may establish that his military service was
such as to prevent a curative statute in the form of a statute of limitation
from barring his claim should not require the rejection of the title as unmerchantable.
SuccEssoRS IN TRUST. Prior to 1894, when the Public Trustee Act was
passed, deeds of trust were executed to private trustees. They usually named
as successor in trust, in the case of death, refusal or inability to serve, removal,
absence, etc., someone else, either a named individual or a designated public
official. And, even since the passage of the Public Trustee Act, the same practice has been followed with respect to trust deeds to private trustees. In
cases, particularly under old deeds of trust, where no public official was so
designated as successor and both the private trustee and the person named
as successor died or moved away or were absent or refused or were unable to
act and a release of the deed of trust or a foreclosure sale under it was
desired, there was no one who could legally execute the release or make the
sale. Because of this situation there was passed in 1915 a statute (1915 S.L.
478-479; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs. 62 and 63) which provided that under the
circumstances .above mentioned the Public Trustee of the county in which
the property involved is located should accept and discharge the duties of
trustee or successor in trust under such trust deed at the request of any per-
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son interested in the property conveyed by it or the debt secured thereby
upon satisfactory proof of the death, absence, refusal or inability to act of
both the trustee and the successor in trust named in the trust deed; with the
further provision that he shall recite the fact of such death, absence, inability
or refusal to act in his trustee's deed or deed of release; and with the express
provision that the section should not apply to continuing offices or officers
named as trustees or successors in trust. And by 1927 S. L. 606, Sec. 48;
1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 155, it is provided that, upon the death of a sole
trustee or the surviving trustee of an express trust created by any written instrument affecting title to real roperty, the trust shall not descend to the
heirs of such trustee nor pass to his personal representative, but that the trust,
if then unexecuted, shall vest in the then Public Trustee and his successors
in office of the county wherein the real estate is situate, with all the powers
of the original trustee, except that, in cases where by law or by the instrument
a successor in trust is provided, the trust shall vest in such successor; with the
proviso that the District Court may upon application of any party in interest
appoint a new trustee.
TAX SALE CERTIFICATES,

LIMITATION

UPON.

There often is shown in

an abstract a tax sale certificate issued many, many years before with no
redemption from the tax sale and no tax deed issued upon it. Its holder, in
most cases, did not care to pay the taxes falling due on the property each
year subsequent to its issuance and in practically every instance its owner
had, as a matter of fact, abandonedohis claims under it. However, it remained
on the records as an encumbrance on the property, even though it had been
abandoned for fifty years and, when an official certificate of taxes due was
secured from the Treasurer, it was shown thereon. There was no reason why
this condition should continue forever, any more than it should with respect
to unreleased mortgages and deeds of trust (see Liens-Extinguishment of).
And so there was enacted 1945 S. L. 671 which, as amended by 1947 S. L.
737-739, 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 142, Sec. 211 (4), provided that no lien
upon real property created by tax certificates or certificates of purchase theretofore or thereafter issued by any County Treasurer on account of delinquent
taxes or assessments should remain a lien for a period longer than fifteen years
after the original issuance thereof and that no Treasurer's deed should issue
on any tax sale evidenced by any such certificate where it shall have ceased
to be a lien pursuant to the provisions of said statute and application for such
Treasurer's deed was not pending at the time of the expiration of the limitation period provided by said statute. It further provided that all unredeemed
certificates upon which a tax deed had not been issued, which should have
been issued before the effective date of said statute and were fifteen or more
years old or would become fifteen years old before May 1, 1947 should remain in full force and effect until May 1, 1947, provided, however, that,
should the holder hereof commence proceedings to procure a tax deed by
making a demand upon County Treasurer for same on or before May 1, 1947,
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his right to receive a tax deed should not be invalidated by the provisions of
the statute. It excepted from its provisions certificates issued to and held by
the county, city, city and county or district levying the tax on which the
certificate was issued, but, in the event of an assignment of such a certificate, its lien should cease fifteen years after its date of issuance; pro,
vided, however, that if the certificate was fifteen years old at the time of such
assignment or would become fifteen years old within one year from the date
of such assignment, the assignee should be entitled to a tax deed if proceed,
ings to procure a tax deed were instituted by making a demand upon the
County Treasurer for same within one year from the date of the assignment
by the county, city, city and county or district levying the tax. It further
required the County Treasurer, immediately upon the expiration of the lien
created by the certificate by reason of this statute, to issue a certificate of
cancellation and to present it to the Recorder who shall enter it in his tax
sale record and file it and it provided that such certificate of cancellation and
the record thereof shall be prima facie evidence of the cancellation of the tax
sale certificate and of the release of the lien thereof.
TAX SALES-REDEMPTION BY PERSONS UNDER LEGAL DISABILITY. 1935
C.S.A. Ch. 142, Sec. 265 allowed minors and mental incompetents to redeem from tax sales until the expiration of one year after the removal of
their respective disabilities and Section 274 of the same Chapter specified
the manner in which they should make the redemption. On the principle
that, in cases where a tax deed has been isued upon a tax sale, persons under
legal disability should not have any longer period in which to redeem from
the sale than they would have in which to bring an action to set. aside the
tax deed (see Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds), the Legislature in
1947 enacted a statute (1947 S. L. 740-741, 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 142,
Sec. 2'74) which amended said Section 274 so as to provide a limitation of
the period for redemption from tax sale by persons who are under legal disability at the time of the execution and delivery of the tax deed to nine years
from the date of the recording of such tax deed, with the provision that, if
the disability be removed or cease within such nine year period, the redemption must be asserted and take place within two years after the removal
or cessation of the disability, but that all redemptions under such statute
must take place within nine years of the recording of the tax deed, irrespective
of the time that the disability was removed. This statute further provided
that all persons against whom the new limitation created by the statute shall
have expired on the effective date of the statute or shall expire within six
months from such effective date may assert their rights of redemption within
six months from such effective date and not thereafter. Those who prepared this amendment evidently overlooked repealing said Section 265 and
it is contemplated that a bill to repeal it will be introduced in the next
session of the Legislature. Such bill will probably also provide for the amendment of Section 262 of the same Chapter (which is the five-year statute of
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limitations) so as to delete the provision which extends the period of limitation
of that statute, as to persons under legal disability, to one year after removal
of disability. This, of course, has nothing to do with the limitations provided
in 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs. 146 and 147 (see Decrees, Judgments and
Official Deeds), since the bar of either of said two statutes of limitation will
apply to any case falling within its provisions without regard to the provisions of the other.
TITLE STANDARDS. Numerous references have been made in this article
to title standards. In 1941 a Committee on Real Estate Title Standards of
the Denver Bar Association was created and on February 2, 1942 that
committee was empowered by the association to promulgate and announce
such standards concerning the examination of abstracts of title as from time
to time may be approved by the committee. Such committee, under the
capable and intelligent chairmanship of Edwin J. Wittelshofer, has issued
up to this time a total of sixty-two title standards. Each standard sets out
a problem which not infrequently is encountered by Colorado attorneys in
examining titles and gives the answer of the committee thereto. Most of
the local bar associations in Colorado outside of Denver have, from time
to time as they have been promulgated by the Denver committee, approved
and adopted these standards. In addition thereto, upon the recommendation
of the Real Estate Title Standards Committee of the Colorado Bar Association, of which committee, also, Mr. Wittelshofer has been the chairman since
its creation, the Colorado Bar Association has at its annual convention each
year adopted the title standards promulgated by the Denver committee
during the preceding year, so that all of the sixty-two standards issued up to
this time are standards both of the Denver Bar Association and of the Colorado Bar Association. These standards have been of great assistance to attorneys throughout the state in establishing, through voluntary acceptance
of them by the attorneys, uniform practice with regard to the various problems covered by them. No small part of such voluntary acceptance of the
the standards by the attorneys has been due to the fact that the Denver
committee, in choosing the problems to be covered by the standards which it
issues, has been careful to select only those problems its answers to which the
committee felt confident could be successfully maintained in the courts.
TRUST DEEDS MERELY LIENS. Until 1934, when it used language to the
contrary (Wright v. Halley, 95 Colo. 148, 151-152, 33 Pac. (2d) 966;
Tolland Co. v. First State Bank of Keenesburg, 95 Colo. 321, 324-325, 35
Pac. (2d) 867), our Supreme Court had held in numerous cases that deeds
of trust (meaning deeds of trust to private trustees executed before the passage of the Public Trustee Act in 1894 and deeds of trust to the Public
Trustee executed thereafter) did not merely create liens but constituted conveyances of the legal title to real estate. Stephens v. Clay, 17 Colo. 489, 491,
30 Pac. 43; Reid v. Sullivan, 20 Colo. 498, 502, 39 Pac. 338; Belmont Mining & Milling Co. v. Costigan, 21 Colo. 471, 479, 42 Pac. 647; Holmquist v.
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Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113, 118, 92 Pac. 232; Foot v. Burr, 41 Colo. 192, 198, 92
Pac. 236; and Bankers Building & Loan Association v. Fleming Brothers Lumber Co., 83 Colo. 335, 338, 264 Pac. 1087. Some of the complications resulting from these holdings are mentioned under the heading Releases of
Trust Deeds-To Whom Made herein. It was felt that there should be no
more reason for a deed of trust to be deemed to constitute a conveyance of
the legal title any more than for a mortgage to do so and that the intention
of the parties to a deed of trust is merely to create a lien to secure an indebtedness. Accordingly there was passed in 1927 a statute (1927 S. L. 592, Sec.
12; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 118) providing that mortgages, trust deeds or
other instruments intended to secure the payment of an obligation affecting
title to or an interest in real property shall not be deemed a conveyance, regardless of their terms, so as to enable the owner of the obligation secured to
recover possession of real property without foreclosure and sale, but the same
shall be deemed a lien.
TRUSTEES. Very often there appears in the chain of title a deed to a
certain person followed by the word "Trustee." Under the decisions, this
placed everyone dealing with the property upon notice that the grantee acquired and held the title only in a fiduciary capacity and put anyone dealing
with the property upon inquiry as to who were the beneficiaries and what
were the terms of the trust. Very often the grantee did not in reality hold
the property in a fiduciary capacity, but acquired it for himself alone and for
reasons of his own had the word "Trustee" added to his name. And, even
where the grantee did acquire the property in a fiduciary capacity, in a large
number of cases there was no way of placing upon the records in a satisfactory
form evidence as to who were the beneficiaries and the terms of the trust,
especially where the grantee acquired it for the benefit of others (including
often associates of his in the enterprise) who were not named in the deed and
there was no written instrument ever executed by the parties evidencing the
arrangement or naming the beneficiaries or the terms of the arrangement.
In such cases there was no way of making the title good except by a suit to
quiet title. To correct, this, in 1921 there was passed a statute (1921 S. L.
187, Secs. 1 and 2; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs. 9 and 10) which provided
that all instruments conveying real estate or interests therein in which the
grantee is described as Trustee, Agent, Executor, etc., or in any other representative capacity, shall name the beneficiary or beneficiaries so represented
and define the trust or other agreement under which the grantee is acting
or refer by proper description to book, page, etc., to an instrument of public
record in the county in which the land is located in which such matters shall
appear and that otherwise the description of a grantee in any such representative capacity in such conveyance shall be considered and held a description
of the person only and shall not be notice of a trust or other representative
capacity of such grantee; with the further provision in the second section that
unless, within five years after the sections became effective, there was filed for
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record in such county, so that such record shall appear in the chain of title to
the land, a statement duly verified setting forth the name of the beneficiary
or beneficiaries and defining the terms of the trust or other agreement establishing the representative relaticnship or referring by proper description to an
instrument of public record in such county in which such matters shall appear, then, at the expiration of such five years, instruments of the kind mentioned in the preceding section, which shall have been executed prior to the
time such sections became effective, shall cease to be notice of such trust or
representative capacity of the grantee and shall be considered and held to be
a description of the person of the grantee only. In Beatty v. Fellows, 101
Colo. 466, 470, 74 Pac. (2d) 677, our Supreme Court held that the addition
of the word "Trustee" to the name of the grantee in a deed signified nothing,
in view of this statute, and that under this statute the word was purely description of the person.
UNRECORDED INSTRUMENTS-AGAINST WHOM INVALID. Prior to 1927
the statute (1921 Comp. Laws, Sec. 4902) provided that instruments affecting title to real estate from and after the filing thereof for record, and not
before, shall take effect "as to subsequent bona fide purchasers and incumbrancers by mortgage, judgment or otherwise not having notice thereof." It
was held in Carroll v. Kit Carson Land Company, 24 Colo. App. 217, 133
Pac. 148 and Brackett v. McClure, 24 Colo. App. 524, 135 Pac. 1110, that,
where there were two chains of alleged title to a piece of real estate, such
as the fee simple title deraigned from the United States and a tax title, those
acquiring claims under one chain were not "bona fide purchasers and incumbrancers" as against those claiming under the other chain under such statute
and that therefore one claiming title under one of the chains could not take
any advantage under such statute of the failure of one claiming title under
the other chain to record the instrument through which he claimed such title.
These decisions were based upon previous holdings of the Appellate Courts
of Colorado cited in the first of these cases that: "A deed duly recorded is
constructive notice of its existence, and of its contents, to all persons claiming
what is thereby conveyed under the same grantor by subsequent purchase or
mortgage, but not to other persons. * * * Such record is constructive notice
only to those who are bound to search for it as subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees, and all others who deal with it on the credit of the title in the
line of which the recorded deed belongs." In the two decisions of the Court
of Appeals which have been cited it was held that a decree in a suit to quiet
title in favor of the holder of the tax title did not affect one holding the title
deraigned from the United States, the conveyance to whom was not recorded
and who had not been made a party to the suit. And in the Carroll case it was
further held that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to
lis pendens did not apply as against one claiming under a different chain of
title than the chain under which the party filing the lis pendens claimed. The
effect of these decisions was to prevent a decree purporting to quiet a tax
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title from making a merchantable title because, although everyone who,
according to the records, owned any interest in or lien upon the original title
was made a party, nevertheless it might afterward develop that a deed conveying the original title or an encumbrance upon the original title had been
executed and not recorded and in such case the decree would be ineffective
as to the grantee or encumbrancer under the unrecorded instrument. As the
result there were passed in 1927 two sections (1927 S. L. 590, Secs. 8 and 9;
1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs. 114, 115). The first of these sections provides
that all instruments affecting title to real property may be recorded in the
office of the Recorder of the county where such real property is situated and
that no such instrument shall be valid as against any class of persons with any
kind of rights, except between the parties thereto, and such as have notice
thereof, until the same shall be deposited with such Recorder. The second
of these sections provides that the filing of notice of pendency of an action
in compliance with law shall, from time of the filing thereof, be notice to all
persons who may subsequently acquire any right, title, interest or estate in
and to the real property described in such notice from any grantor or from
any source whatsoever. Said Section 8 (Section 114 of C.S.A.) was before
the Colorado Supreme Court for consideration in Moore v. Chalmers-Galloway
Livestock Company, 90 Colo. 548, 10 Pac. (2d) 950, and its validity, constitutionality and applicability were sustained by the Court in that case as
against one claiming under a different chain of title whose conveyance was
executed eight years before the passage of the new statute and was not recorded during such eight years or during the period of almost two years after
the passage of the new statute.
USE RESTRICTIONS. See Building and Use Restrictions.
VACATIONS OF ROADWAYS. Occasionally an attorney was compelled to
object to the title to land which had been dedicated to public use as a street,
alley or road on the ground that the purported vacation of same did not
comply with the technical requirements of our statutes, even though the land
had not been used as a roadway for many years and even had been enclosed,
with adjoining land, by fences. In 1949 the Legislature enacted 1949 S. L. 620623 which contained provisions specifying the persons in whom the title to
the land included in roadways should vest under various circumstances upon
the vacation of such roadways and the manner in which such vacation should
be made. Such statute also provided that any written instrument of vacation,
or a resubdivision plat purporting to vacate or relocate roadways or portions
thereof, which has remained or shall have remained of record in the county
where the roadway is situate for a period of seven years shall be prima facie
evidence of an effective vacation of such former roadways. It further provided that the foregoing shall not apply during the pendency of an action
commenced prior to the expiration of said seven years to set aside, modify
or annul the vacation, or when the vacation has been set aside, modified
or annulled by proper order or decree of a competent court and notice of
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the Recorder's office of the county where the property is located. Such statute
further provided that any limitation established by it shall apply to causes
of action which accrued prior to its effective date as well as those accruing
thereafter, provided, however, that the right to institute an action shall not
be barred by reason of such limitation until the expiration of six months from
said effective date.
WILLS-POWERS OF SALE UNDER. In the absence of a statute to the
contrary, a power of sale of real estate conferred by will upon an executor
cannot be exercised by an administrator with the will annexed unless by the
terms of the will the sale of the real estate is mandatory and not discretionary.
Because of this there was passed, as a part of the revision made in 1903 of
the statutes relating to administration of estates, a section (1903 S.L. 504,
Sec. 91; 1908 Rev. Stat. Sec. 7167) providing that whenever any testator
shall by his last will direct that his real estate or any of it be sold or otherwise disposed of for the payment of his debts or for any other purpose, and
no executor be named therein or if the executor named therein refuse such
office or be removed or die, the administrator with the will annexed or
de bonis non may sell, convey and dispose of such real estate in accordance
with the provisions of such will in the same manner and with like effect as.
the executor in such will and duly qualified might have done. It will be
noted that in the early part of this section appeared the words, "shall, by his
last will, direct that his real estate, or any of it, be sold or otherwise disposed
of." Because of this titles were very often objected to because the will did
not direct the sale of the real estate in question but merely authorized the
sale of the real estate by the executor. By reason thereof the section was
amended (1921 S.L. 821, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 176, Sec. 156) so as to change
the words hereinbefore quoted to "shall, by his last will, confer power for
the sale of his real estate, or any of it, or for its disposition otherwise." In
1947 this section was further amended (1947 S.L. 943, Sec. 11, 1935 C.S.A.
Suppl. Ch. 176, Sec. 156) by adding the words "resident or non-resident"
and "in the State of Colorado" so as to leave no doubt as to it being applicable to the estates of non-resident testators as well as to estates of resident
testators. This section and 1949 S. L. 769-770, See. 16 (which amended
1935 C.S.A. Ch. 176, Sec. 62 (d)) relating to the execution of conveyances,
encumbrances and contracts by the personal representative or trustee appointed by a court of another state under a will admitted to probate in that
state are the basis of Title Standards Nos. 57 and 58.
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Some Problems Concerning Oil and Gas Leases
And the Rule Against Perpetuities
By HOVER T. LENTZ
of the Denver Bar*

In 1620 the Court of King's Bench held that an executory interest limited
upon a freehold estate was indestructible.' Having recognized such an indestructible interest, the courts then decided that this principle should not be
allowed to go too far toward tying-up property. Thus in 1682 in the now
famous Duke of Norfolk's Case 2 the character of the modern rule against
perpetuities as a rule which prohibited remotely contingent future interests
was first clearly laid down. As stated by Professor Gray the rule is: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years
after some life in being at the creation of the interest." 3 How does this fundamental rule of property law affect modern versions of oil and gas leases?
Technically, the rule is applied only to the vesting of'a future interest
although many courts loosely apply the rule to such related problems as the
permissible duration of private trusts and the permissible period of suspension
of the absolute power of alienation. The situation is further clouded by the
application of statutes in various states. The scope of this paper will be
limited mainly to the application of the rule in its technical sense.
The application of the rule to oil and gas leases arises chiefly from the
theory of vesting pronounced in the early case of Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts.4
It was there determined that an oil and gas lessee obtained no vested interest under the lease itself until oil or gas is discovered. 5 This principle
naturally led to the contention that interests vested by certain types of oil gas
leases were void as violative of the rule against perpetuities.
Assuming the soundness of such theory, it appears that the following
types of leases would violate the rule: (1) a lease of the "no term" type
used in connection with an "unless" drilling clause, 6 and (2) a lease which
uses the "unless" drilling clause in connection with a term of more than
twenty-one years. In either of these cases it is possible that the vesting of
the lessee's interest on the discovery of oil can be -postponed for a period
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of law.
'Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620).
23 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
'Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed., 1942) sec. 201.
4 152 Pa. 451, 25 Atd 732 (1893).
'The court said: "The title (in any oil lease) is inchoate, and for purposes of exploration only until oil is found. If it is not found, no estate vests in the lessee, and his
title, whatever it is, ends when the unsuccessful search is abandoned. If oil is found,
then the right to produce becomes a vested right * * *'"
'i.e., a provision that if the lessee does not drill within a specified time, the lease
is to terminate, unless the lessee pays certain sums periodically in advance to keep the
lease alive.
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beyond lives in being plus twenty-one years for, under such leases, the lessee
may delay drilling indefinitely by the payment of a periodic rental. The
lessee thus has what amounts to a perpetual option to drill7 or not to drill,
and perpetual options are generally held to violate the rule.
The validity of the "no term" lease was first questioned under the rule
against perpetuities in Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co.," where the court held that
the rule was not violated by a lease for a period of five years and as much
longer as either oil or gas was produced, with the further stipulation that the
lessee could pay a yearly rental indefinitely in lieu of drilling. The court
reasoned that there was nothing in the lease to deny the lessor an implied
right to terminate the lease upon reasonable notice. This is clearly unsound
and the great weight of modern authority refuses to imply a condition in a
lease against delay in development in direct contravention of an express provision providing for such delay. 9
Recent Decisions Side-Step Issue
The rule pronounced in the Venture Oil case 0 has, however, been generally repudiated in recent decisions, and the present tendency is to hold that
immediately upon the execution of an oil and gas lease some sort of estate or
interest vests in the lessee,' thus sidestepping the problem raised by the
Venture Oil decision.

Another question arises in connection with leases providing for perpetual
renewal. Such a covenant, in the absence of a statutory prohibition, is gen12
erally held valid on the theory that it is a part of the lessee's present interest,
and so there is no remote vesting.
Thus the universal provision for a primary term and as "long thereafter
as either oil or gas is or can be produced from any well on said land" is no
13
longer subject to question in most jurisdictions.
' Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 371, 56 S. E. 527 (1907) (action for specific
performance); Eastman Marble Co. v. Verft.ont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N. E.
177 (1920) (action for damages). The effect of these cases is that neither an action for
damages nor an action for specific performance may be maintained on a perpetual option.
See also 162 ALR 581.
'78 W. Va. 329, 88 S. E. 1075 (1916).
Summers, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (perm. ed., 1942) sec. 397 and numerous
cases cited therein.
"Note 4, supra.
" Rosson v. Bennett, Tex. Civ. App. 1927, 294 S. W. 660; Summers, THE LAW
OF OIL AND GAS (perm. ed., 1942) sec. 171.
"Thaw v. Gaffney, 75 W. Va. 229, 83 S. E. 983, 3 A.L.R. 495 (1914); Becker v.
Submarine Oil Co., 55 Cal. App. 698, 204 Pac. 245 (1924); 3 A.L.R. 498; 39 A.L.R.
280; 162 A.L.R. 1147; Contra: Morrison v. Rossignol, 5 Cal. 64 (1855).
"Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F. (2d) 807 (C.C.A., 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S.
561, 57 S. St. 23, 81 L. Ed. 413, where the court said that an option given to lessee to
purchase lessor's royalty rights whenever during the duration of such a ease the lessor
should offer the same for sale "was within neither the purpose nor the reason for the
rule" against perpetuities. However, note the contentions raised in Lloyd's Estate v.
Mullen Tractor & Equipment Co., infra Note 18.
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Some decisions have construed an oil and gas lease to constitute a profit
a' prendre, and in such case the rule does not usually apply since a profit is
generally a present interest in property. 14 If, however, the profit is to vest
at a future date, the rule is applicable.
Several recent cases have presented various facets of the problem. In
Francis v. Superior Oil Co. 5 the lease provided that it should remain in force
for five years from the time when the lessee could legally enter and drill,
and so long thereafter as oil or gas was produced on such land. At the time
of the execution of the lease, a city ordinance prohibited drilling on the land
in question. The court sustained the lease against the contention that it was
void for remoteness and that it violated a statute prohibiting suspension of the
power of alienation for more than twenty-one years. The court first held that
the lessee had obtained a present interest immediately upon execution of the
lease in the nature of a profit a' prendre and laid much stress on the fact
that the parties must have contemplated removal of the restriction within a
reasonable time, or, if not, a termination of the lease obligations. In fact,
the restriction was lifted within a few months and the property was drilled.
This latter reasoning seems tenuous in view of the clear principle that an instrument said to create a perpetuity is to be construed as of the time of its
effective date, and if any possibility of remoteness exists under the facts on
such date, the interest is void regardless of the intentions of the parties. 16
In this case it was very possible at the time the lease was executed that the
ordinance would not be repealed within a period of twenty-one years,' 7 and
it appears clear from the terms of the lease that the removal of the prohibition
on drilling was a condition precedent to the inception of the lessee's interest.
Even though a profit is usually not within the scope of the rule, the creation
of a profit to vest beyond the period of twenty-one years would come within
its condemnation.
But The Rule Cannot Be Ignored
Another interesting case which, although upholding the lease in issue,
indicates that the rule against perpetuities cannot be entirely ignored as far
as oil and gas leases are concerned arose in Mississippi in 1941.18 In a suit
to cancel a lease, the issue in the Venture Oil and Wilson cases was again
presented. The lease provided for a term of five years from the date of execution and "as much longer as oil, gas or either of them shall be produced from
Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed., 1942) sec. 279.
102 F. (2d) 732 (C.C.A. Okla., 1939).
"Miller v. Weston, 67 Colo. 534, 189 Pac. 610 (1920) where the court said: "the
rule against perpetuities is no rule at all unless the condition required to satisfy it is
absolutely certain to take place within lives in being plus twenty-one years."
" If there are no measuring lives, then the period is twenty-one years. Closset v.
Burtchaell, 112 Ore. 585, 230 Pac. 554 (1924).
" Lloyd's Estate v. Mullen Tractor & Equipment Co., 192 Miss. 62, 4 So. (2d)
282 (1941).
'5
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said lands by the lessee in paying quantities." The lessee had the option to
postpone development indefinitely by payment of annual rental and exercised
such option for several years. Cancellation was denied on appeal. The court
relied on the general propositions mentioned above that at all times there
were persons in being who could join to convey the fee, hence no restraint
upon alienation could exist, and that the rule against perpetuities was not
violated since "whatever interest was acquired by the lessee * * * by virtue
of the lease in question was conveyed to him to take effect in praesenti."
However, the fact that this case arose so recently suggests the possibility that
such' leases may still be open to attack in other jurisdictions.
The present use of pooling agreements in connection with scientific development programs gives rise to another possible application of the rule
against perpetuities. Present-day oil and gas leases frequently contain a
clause which gives to the lessee power to pool "at any time" for development
purposes all or any part of the leased land with adjacent lands owned by third
persons. Such leases further stipulate that payment of royalties on production from the pooled area will be made to the respective owners in proportion
to acreage ownership and that production from any part of the pooled acreage will satisfy rental, drilling and habendum clause obligations of all leases
within the pooled area. Such clauses may be attacked under the rule since
they give to the lessee a virtually unlimited power to create new property
interests in third persons in the land so leased at any time in the future. In
the only case found in which this issue has been litigated the result was far
from conclusive. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld such a clause in
Imes et al. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co. et al. 19 by construing the phrase
"at any time" to mean a reasonable time on the assumption that such was
the obvious intention of the parties. Therefore, the lessee's interest was not
too remote. As pointed out above by reference to Miller v. Weston, 20 this
type of reasoning is unsatisfactory since the rule against perpetuities is not
one of construction, but, on the contrary, is a strict rule of law to be strictly
applied. It is suggested that the holding in this case should be questioned and
that the practical answer is to limit the time during which the leased land
may be pooled to a period of less than twenty-one years. This would eliminate
questions regarding the possible remoteness of such pooling clauses. It should
be noted that a similar problem may arise in connection with clauses permitting the lessee to unitize the land.
In conclusion, it may be stated that the rule should be carefully considered in drafting leases which have the effect and purpose of postponing
development for an indefinite period or of giving the lessee power to place
the land in a pool or unit at any time in the indefinite future. Although many
questions appear to be settled, the applicability of the rule to oil and gas interests has not been raised in a number of important oil producing states, and
the possibility of vexatious litigation still remains.
79, 84 P. (2d) 1106 (1938).
184 Okla.
16, supra.

',
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Federal Controls of Uranium-Bearing Ores
By

CHRISTOPHER

J.

ALLISON*

Since the explosion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima in 1945, the
importance to a nation of a supply of uranium has received more discussion
than the importance of a supply of gold and silver.' Because ores bearing
uranium are basic raw materials in the production of atomic energy, they

are subject to certain federal controls stemming from the provisions of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946.2 These controls are superimposed upon prior
existing federal statutes, regulations of the Department of Interior, and state
mining law. General information on the extent of these controls should be of

particular interest to attorneys practicing in this state.
A permit from the federal government is not needed in order to prospect
for uranium on federal lands except in certain localities as Indian reservations.

Arrangements for the lease or purchase of uranium mining rights in privately
owned lands may be made as in the case of any other land.
At the present time the Atomic Energy Commission is carrying on
extensive uranium surveys on the Colorado Plateau. The public land in this
area of approximately 150 square miles in southwestern Colorado and south3
eastern Utah, has been withdrawn from mineral entry and appropriation.
work
area,
in
this
withdrawn
claims
on
privately-held
Where ore is found
by the Commission will stop when it is thought that indications justify the
4
On
owner continuing exploration and development at his own expense.
completion of exploration in a given area, those lands withdrawn from mineral
entry will be released from the withdrawal orders and will again be open for
entry. It is expected that such lands found to contain uranium will become
* Student at the University of Denver College of Law.
'Over 100 minerals bear uranium, but only two are responsible for the greater part
of the world's present supply-pitchblend and carnotite. DE MENT, J., AND DAKE, H.
C., HANDBOOK OF URANIUM

MINERALS,

p. 46, Mineralogist Printing Co.

(1948).

Pitchblend, the only primary mineral-bearing uranium, is by far the most important, but
this ore has not been discovered in major concentrations in the United States.
Carnotite is found in a number of localities in the world, and the deposits in the
Colorado Plateau area are the best known source in the United States. Discovered
in 1899, they have been the principal domestic source of vanadium, radium-, and uranium.
Only high grade ore was taken for radium extraction in the early period of productior,
but since 1937 the Colorado Plateau deposits of carnotite have been mined intensively
for vanadium.

Fisher, FEDERAL EXPLORATION FOR CARNOTITE, address delivered at the

annual meeting of the Colorado Mining Association, Denver, Colorado, February 1,
1949. Only in the last few years has uranium been recognized as something other than
an almost useless by-product of carnotite.
Geologically, carnotite is a secondary mineral, having been formed from primary
minerals by weathering or natural processes. In the Colorado Plateau area carnotite
occurs in placers. It is widely scattered in the sandstones where it occurs in rich,
powdery masses filling intertices between grains of sandstones and in cracks and crevices.
:Public Law 585, 79th Congress.
Public Land Orders 459, 494, 595.
'Fisher, R. P., supra, note 1.
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available for development by private interest under arrangements with the
Commission. 5
Although the Atomic Energy Act provides that all uranium and thorium
on those public lands which were vacant and unoccupied on August 1, 1946,
is reserved "for the use of the United States", it is the view of the Commission and the Department of Interior that this provision does not prevent the
staking of a valid claim as a result of the discovery of uranium or thorium,
and will generally not prevent the locator from mining or selling the ore."
The Bureau of Land Management of the Department of Interior has
set forth the standard procedure for staking claims on the public domain,
and this procedure is applicable to uranium ores. Generally a location is
made by staking the corners of the claim, posting notice of the location
thereon, and complying with the state laws regarding the recordation of location in the county recorder's office. All state mining laws supplemental to
United States mining laws must be observed. A patent is not necessary in
order to develop, mine and dispose of uranium, but possessory right must be
maintained by the performance of annual assessment work on the claim in
7
order to prevent its relocation by another.
Powers of The Commission
Because the Atomic Energy Act provides that the Federal government
retains rights in uranium ores located on all public lands after August 1,
1946, the Atomic Energy Commission has the right to enter public lands
which are subject to location and remove the uranium or thorium. It may
also require the delivery to the Commission of uranium or thorium located
on public lands after the metal has been mined and separated. If the Commission exercises either of these powers, it does not have to pay for the
uranium removed, but compensation is allowed for any damages caused by
the Commission's action and for any by-product, such as vanadium, which
is removed with the uranium. In the latter case it must pay for the reasonable
value of one's services and labor, including a profit.
Although the right of entry or the power to require delivery exists, the
Commission has followed the policy of acquiring uranium ores through commercial means. Guaranteed minimum prices have been established, and ores
meeting the specifications (0.10 percent U 30 8 ) will be purchased by the
Commission or its authorized agent. Delivered ores assaying less than 0.10
percent become the property of the Commission
or its agent as liquidated
8
damages for the buyer's expense of assaying.
'Prospecting

for Uranium, United States Atomic Energy Commission and the

United States Geological Survey (1949).
' Prospecting for Uranium, supra, note 5.
Circular No. 1278, United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land
Management.
' Circulars 1, 3, and 5, Domestic Price Schedules, United States Atomic Energy
Commission.
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The Atomic Energy Act provides that no person may transfer or deliver,
receive possession of, or title to, source material (uranium or thorium) after
removal from its place of deposit in nature without a license from the Commission. 9 Source material in order to be subject to licensing must contain by
weight 0.05 percent or more of uranium or thorium or any combination thereof.
The $10,000.00 bonus being offered by the Federal government was
made "to stimulate prospecting for, discovery of, and production from new
high grade domestic uranium deposits". This bonus will not be paid merely
for the discovery alone, but only in connection with delivery to the Commission of the first 20 short tons of uranium bearing ores or mechanical concentrates assaying 20 percent or more uranium by weight from any single
mining location, lode, or placer which has not been previously worked for
uranium. Further, this bonus does nor apply to delivery of ores of the
Colorado Plateau area for which the Commission has established guaranteed
minimum prices. 10
To date the Colorado Mining Association has not received information
of any prospectors or miners receiving this bonus.

New Members of The Denver Bar Association
At the first two meetings of the new association year, the following fifty
attorneys were admitted to membership in the Denver Bar Association:
E. A. Howard Baker, Jr., Ernest S. Baker, Virginia E. Baker, Bernard
L. Beck, Silvio H. Bottone, Louis W. Burford, George L. Creamer, Dorothy
M. Davis, James J. Delaney, Joseph F. Dolan, Howard E. Erickson, Frederick
M. Farrar, Wesley W. Forsyth, Bert A. Gallegos, Thomas A. Gilliam,
Milton G. Janecek, William D. Johnson, Philip C. Klingsmith, Jr., C. J.
Lewis, Lila I. Ludlam, Andrew M. Lungren, James N. Matteson, Thomas E.
McCarthy, George M. McNamara, Robert D. Means, Charles B. Messenger,
Arch L. Metzner, Jr., Anne L. Miller, Robert S. Mitchell, Robert B. Moch,
James D. Parriott, Jr., Bruce Ownbey, John E. Radloff, H. Joe Rawlinson, Jr.,
Warren E. Roberts, Melvin Rossman, Ralph Sargent, Jr., Roy S. Scott, Jr.,
Edwin M. Sears, Norman B. Smith, Walter A. Steele, Robert Sunshine,
George K. Voseipka, Lindsay P. Walden, Westel B. Wallace, James L.
Webb, Ford E. Weyandt, Winston W. Wolvington, Jane C. Woodhouse,
and William R. Young.

Southern Colorado Bar Association
Officers of the Southern Colorado Bar Association during the current
year are: Joseph F. Nigro of Trinidad, president; William B. Nicholas of
Walsenburg, vice-president; and Gilbert Sanders of Trinidad, secretarytreasurer.
'Licensing Regulations 40.2, United States Atomic Energy Commission.
'"Circular No. 2, Domestic Price Schedule, United States Atomic Energy Com.
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Denver Justice Courts Reorganize
Significant changes affecting the Justice and Municipal Courts of the
City and County of Denver are scheduled to take place commencing January
1, 1950. All justice court criminal cases, which include misdemeanors and
preliminary hearings, and which were heretofore filed in the justice courts
located in the City and County Building, will be filed in the justice court
located in the Police Building, 13th and Champa Streets.
This transfer of criminal cases will free the justice courts in the City
and County Building so that full time may be devoted to the hearing of
civil matters. This part of the change is aimed at remedying an existing
condition which prevented expeditious hearings because of the heavy work
load.
At the same time, the traffic division of the municipal and justice courts
will be transferred from the Police Building to the City and County Building.
This court will be located in the southwest corner of the main floor. The
Traffic Violations Bureau, which handles the automatic pleas of guilty on
minor, non-hazardous traffic violations, will be transferred from the Police
Building to the City and County Building near the new traffic division.
The clerks' offices of both justice courts now located in the City and
County Building, together with the clerks' office of the traffic division, will
be consolidated in a clerks' office to be located adjacent to the new traffic
division.
These changes are aimed at equalizing the work load in the various
justice and municipal courts to the end that greater service may be rendered
the public and members of the bar. The assignment of judges as announced
in the change is as follows:
Civil-Division No. 1-Judge Robert H. McWilliams, Jr.
Civil-Division No. 2-Judge David W. Oyler.
Traffic-Division No. 3-Judge David Brofman.
Police and Criminal Division No.. 4-Judge Frank E. Hickey.

Third International Conference of The Legal Profession
Members of the legal profession throughout the world are invited to
attend the Third International Conference of the Legal Profession, which will
be held in London, under the auspices of the International Bar Association
(of which the American Bar Association is a member) from July 19 to July
26, 1950.
Those who desire to attend should communicate immediately with Amos
J. Peaslee, Secretary-General of the International Bar Association, 501 Fifth
Avenue, New York 17, N. Y. Forms of enrollment, and of notice of intention
to submit papers on topics to be considered at the conference will be sent upon
request. Additional preliminary information is available in the secretary's
office, 319 Chamber of Commerce Bldg., Denver.
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Six Honorary Life Members Named
At the regular monthly meeting of the Denver Bar Association on
November 7, at which Dr. Bradford Murphy was the featured speaker,
honorary life membership certificates were presented to the following attorneys with 50 or more years of service at the bar: L. Ward Bannister,
Edwin I. Grenfell, William V. Hodges, Gerald Hughes, Frank McLaughlin,
and Charles J. Munz.
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Blue Cross Enrollment Possible Now
The Colorado Hospital Service has informed the secretary's office that
until December 15, 1949, new enrollments will be accepted for the Denver
Bar Association's Blue Cross group without regard for the regular anniversary
enrollment date, which is August 1.
Any members of the Denver Bar Association who do not now carry
Blue Cross hospitalization, but desire to do so, should get an application
from the secretary's office immediately. Blue Shield benefits are not available
through the bar association group.
Greetings to the Bar Association
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